Abstract-Dynamic routing protocols such as RIP and OSPF essentially implement distributed algorithms for solving the shortest paths problem. The border gateway protocol (BGP) is currently the only interdomain routing protocol deployed in the Internet. BGP does not solve a shortest paths problem since any interdomain protocol is required to allow policy-based metrics to override distance-based metrics and enable autonomous systems to independently define their routing policies with little or no global coordination. It is then natural to ask if BGP can be viewed as a distributed algorithm for solving some fundamental problem. We introduce the stable paths problem and show that BGP can be viewed as a distributed algorithm for solving this problem. Unlike a shortest path tree, such a solution does not represent a global optimum, but rather an equilibrium point in which each node is assigned its local optimum.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE BORDER gateway protocol (BGP) is currently the only interdomain routing protocol employed on the Internet [13] , [18] , [19] . BGP allows each autonomous system to independently formulate its routing policies, and it allows these policies to override distance metrics in favor of policy concerns. In contrast to pure distance-vector protocols such as RIP [2] , [14] , BGP is not safe in the sense that routing policies can conflict in a manner that causes BGP to diverge, resulting in persistent route oscillations [21] . Moreover, the safety of BGP routing policies may not be robust with respect to network failures. Recent studies have highlighted the adverse effects of interdomain routing instability [16] , [17] . Although it is not known if any of the observed BGP instability has been caused by policy conflicts, in the worst case such conflicts could introduce extreme oscillations into the global routing system. The goal of this paper is to clarify the nature of BGP policy inconsistencies that give rise to protocol divergence. Our main contribution is to describe a general condition on routing policies that guarantees safety and robustness.
We introduce the stable paths problem (SPP), which captures the underlying semantics of any path vector protocol such as BGP. Just as routing protocols such as RIP and OSPF implement distributed algorithms for solving the shortest paths problem, we claim that BGP can be viewed as a distributed algorithm for solving the stable paths problem. Informally, the stable paths problem consists of an undirected graph with a distinguished node called the origin. All other nodes have a set of permitted paths to the origin. Each node also has a ranking function on its permitted paths that indicates an order of preference. A solution to the stable paths problem is an assignment of permitted paths to nodes so that each node's assigned path is its highest ranked path extending any of the assigned paths at its neighbors. Such a solution does not represent a global maximum, but rather an equilibrium point in which each node is assigned its local maximum.
We then study the stable paths problem using a derived structure called a dispute wheel, which represents a circular set of dependencies between routing policies that cannot be simultaneously satisfied. We show that if no dispute wheel can be constructed, then the corresponding stable paths problem has a unique solution. We define the simple path vector protocol (SPVP) as a distributed means of computing solutions to the stable paths problem. We show that if there is no dispute wheel, then SPVP is guaranteed to converge to the unique solution of the corresponding stable paths problem.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a simplified picture of how BGP operates and provides motivation for the definition of the stable paths problem. In Section III, we define the stable paths problem (SPP). This formalism provides a simple semantics for routing policies of path vector protocols such as BGP while remaining free of many nonessential details. There is a tradeoff between the complexity of the SPP formalism and the complexity of the translation from a set of BGP routing policies to an instance of SPP. We opted for SPP simplicity, since the theoretical results remain quite challenging even for this model. Hence numerous BGP-specific details, such as internal BGP, confederations, route servers, private AS numbers, and so on, are pushed into the translation.
The protocol SPVP is defined in Section IV. We analyze the stable paths problem in Section V. We explore the computational complexity of the stable paths problem and show that the problem of determining whether an instance of the stable paths problem has a solution is NP-complete. We define the notion of a dispute wheel, and show that an instance of SPP with no dis-pute wheel always has a unique solution. We also show that the protocol SPVP can only diverge when there is a dispute wheel.
In Section VI, we explore the relationship between the stable paths and shortest paths problems. SPP is different from shortest paths problem for several reasons. First, the relative ranking of paths in SPP is not, in general, based on path lengths. Second, each node can reject paths arbitrarily, even shortest paths. Even so, it seems a natural question to ask which instances of the stable paths problem are consistent with some edge cost function. Even in this case, one may find routing trees which are not shortest path trees with respect to the cost function. However, we show that any instance of the stable paths problem that is consistent with a cost function without nonpositive cycles will be safe. An immediate consequence of this is that if we ignore internal BGP (IBGP), then BGP configurations that are simply based on "hop count" are safe, even with "padding" of AS paths. On the other hand, we show that BGP-like systems can actually violate "distance metrics" and remain safe.
Finally, Section VII discusses the implication of our results for the stable paths problem for real-world BGP as well as open problems.
A. Related Work
Bertsekas et al. [1] prove convergence for a distributed version of the Bellman-Ford shortest path algorithm. Because of the differences between BGP and shortest path routing mentioned above, these results do not directly apply to a protocol such as BGP.
In Varadhan et al. [21] , the convergence properties of an abstraction of BGP is studied. They describe a system (similar to BAD GADGET of Fig. 2 ) as an example of policies which lead to divergence. In their setting, a node must update each time it receives a new route-to-origin "advertisement" from one of its neighbors. This is in contrast to our model where an arbitrary update sequence determines when nodes process their neighbor's path choices. They also define the notion of an auxiliary graph, called a return graph, to study convergence. Return graphs are defined only for systems with a ring topology, and a restricted set of allowable paths at each node, namely the counterclockwise paths. A return graph is defined as follows. For a node and two permitted paths from to 0, they define an arc if when storing at , and updating the nodes clockwise around the ring, the node adopts when is considered again. Thus return graphs are defined by the dynamic behavior of the system for a particular activation sequence whereas the dispute wheels defined in this paper is based purely on the static nature of the local preference functions of the nodes in the system. In addition, we consider a more general evaluation model, more general topologies, and arbitrary ranking of permitted paths.
Gouda and Schneider [7] , [8] have studied metrics which always have a maximal tree, that is, a tree in which every node has its most preferred path to the origin contained in the tree. This notion is different from the central notion of a stable tree introduced in Section III. The latter is based on reaching a local optimum as opposed to requiring each node having its globally preferred path. A metric in their work corresponds to a method for ranking paths based on a given assignment of values from a prescribed set to the edges of the graph. In particular, this implies a universal ranking of how desirable each path is. They characterize the "maximizable" metrics, i.e., those which admit a maximal tree for any graph and any valid assignment. They show, in particular, that any such metric must be monotonic in the sense that if is a sub-path of , then cannot be less desirable than (for the shortest path metric this means that edges can only be assigned nonnegative costs).
Griffin and Wilfong [11] have shown that statically detecting solvability for real-world BGP is NP-hard. The translation from the "high-level" specification language used in that paper into an instance of the stable paths problem (see Section II) may take exponential time and space (in the number of nodes). Even so, in Section V-A we show that the basic question of solvability is still NP-complete for instances of the stable paths problem.
II. BGP ROUTE SELECTION
In order to motivate the SPP formalism, we briefly review the route selection process of BGP [13] , [18] , [19] . BGP employs a large number of attributes to convey information about each destination. For example, one BGP attribute records the path of all autonomous systems that the route announcement has traversed. For these reasons, BGP is often referred to as a path vector protocol. The BGP attributes are used by import policies and export policies at each router to implement its routing policies. In modeling BGP, we make several simplifying assumptions. First, we ignore all issues relating to internal BGP (IBGP), including the MED attribute. As a corollary to this, we assume that there is at most one link between any two autonomous systems. Second, we ignore address aggregation.
In BGP, route announcements are passed between routers. These announcements are records that include the following attributes. network layer reachability information (address block for a set of destinations) next hop (address of next hop router) ordered list of autonomous systems traversed local preference set of community tags
The local preference attribute local pref is not passed between autonomous systems, but is used internally within an autonomous system to assign a local degree of preference.
Each record is associated with a 3-tuple, -, defined as For a given destination , the records with are ranked using lexical ordering on -. The best route selection procedure for BGP [18] picks routes with the highest rank. In other words, if two route records share the same nlri value, then the record with the highest local preference is most preferred. If local preference values are equal, then the record with the shortest as path is preferred. Finally, ties are broken with preference given to the record with the lowest IP address for its next hop value. Note that this ordering is "strict" in the sense that if two records are ranked equally, then . Route selection based on highest rank is deterministic since at any time there is at most one route record learned from next hop with a given nlri.
A We say that is permitted at when . We can then define a ranking function, , on AS-paths permitted at as the lexical rank of -.
III. STABLE PATHS PROBLEM (SPP)
The SPP formalism defined below is based on the notion of permitted paths and ranking functions on these paths. In terms of BGP, we can think of SPVP as capturing the semantics that translate the apparent routing policies at autonomous system into the actual routing policies at . Note that the actual routing policies at are the result of the interaction between routing policies of many, possibly distant, autonomous systems. The SPP framework is designed to capture the underlying semantics of any path vector protocol such as BGP. We seek to study the safety of routing policies in a manner independent of the details used to implement those policies.
Let be a simple, undirected graph where is the set of nodes and is the set of edges. For any node is the set of peers for . We assume that node 0, called the origin, is special in that it is the destination to which all other nodes attempt to establish a path.
A path in is either the empty path, denoted by , or a sequence of nodes, , such that for each is in . Note that if , then represents the trivial path consisting of the single node . Each nonempty path has a direction from its first node to its last node . If and are nonempty paths such that the first node in is the same as the last node in , then denotes the path formed by the concatenation of these paths. We extend this with the convention that , for any path . For example, (4 3 2) (2 1 0) represents the path (4 3 2 1 0), whereas (2 1 0) represents the path (2 1 0). This notation is most commonly used when is a path starting with node and is an edge in . In this case denotes the path that starts at node , traverses the edge , and then follows path from node .
For each denotes the set of permitted paths from to the origin (node 0). This set represents all possible permitted paths at that can be formed by extending the paths assigned to the peers of . Given a node , suppose that is a subset of the permitted paths such that each path in has a distinct next hop. Then the best path in is defined to be with maximal o.w.
The path assignment is stable at node if
Note that if is stable at node and , then the set of choices at must be empty. The path assignment is stable if it is stable at each node . We often write a path assignment as a vector, , where . (We omit since it is always
.) It is easy to check that if is stable, and , then . Therefore, any stable path assignment implicitly defines a tree rooted at the origin. Note, however, that this is not always a spanning tree.
The stable paths problem is solvable if there is a stable path assignment for . A stable path assignment is also called a solution for . If no such assignment exists, then is unsolvable. Fig. 1 (a) presents a stable paths problem called SHORTEST 1. The ranking function for each nonzero node is depicted as a vertical list next to the node, with the highest ranked path at the top going down to the lowest ranked nonempty path at the bottom. The stable path assignment is illustrated in Fig. 1(b) . If we reverse the ranking order of paths at node we arrive at SHORTEST 2, depicted in Fig. 1(c) . The stable path assignment is illustrated in Fig. 1(d) . In both cases, the ranking functions prefer shorter paths to longer paths and the solutions are shortest path trees. Note that the ranking at node 4 breaks ties between paths of equal length. This results in one shortest path tree as the solution for SHORTEST 1, while another shortest path tree as the solution for SHORTEST 2.
The ranking of paths is not required to prefer shorter paths to longer paths. For example, Fig. 2 (a) presents a stable paths problem called GOOD GADGET. Note that both nodes 1 and 2 prefer longer paths to shorter paths. The stable path assignment illustrated in Fig. 2(b) is not a shortest path tree. This is the unique solution to this problem.
A modification of GOOD GADGET, called NAUGHTY GADGET, is shown in Fig. 2(c) . NAUGHTY GADGET adds one permitted path (3 4 2 0) for node 3, yet it has the same unique solution as GOOD GADGET. However, as is explained in Section IV, the protocol SPVP can diverge for this problem. Finally, by reordering the ranking of paths at node 4, we produce a specification called BAD GADGET, presented in Fig. 2(d) . This specification has no solution and the SPVP protocol will always diverge.
So far, our examples each has had at most one solution. This is not always the case. The simplest instance, called DISAGREE, having more than one solution is illustrated in Fig. 3(a) . The stable path assignment is depicted in Fig. 3(b) . An alternative solution is shown in Fig. 3(c) . No other path assignments are stable for this problem. (4 0) is added and made the highest ranked path at node 4. The unique solution to this problem is illustrated in Fig. 4(b) . Note that if the edge is deleted, then this system becomes BAD GADGET. In terms of routing, this models the failure of link , and illustrates the fact that a network with a stable routing tree can be transformed into one with no solution with the failure of a single link.
IV. SIMPLE PATH VECTOR PROTOCOL (SPVP)
This section presents a simple path vector protocol (SPVP) for solving the stable paths problem in a distributed manner. SPVP represents an abstract version of the existing BGP protocol. This protocol always diverges when a stable paths problem has no solution. It can also diverge for stable path problems that are solvable. The protocol SPVP defined below differs from the simpler model of evaluation presented in [10] , [11] . Here, we use a message processing framework which employs a reliable first-in-first-out (FIFO) queue of messages for communication between peers.
In SPVP, the messages exchanged between peers are simply paths. When a node adopts a path it informs each by sending path to . There are two data structures at each node . The path is 's current path to the origin. For each -stores the path sent from most recently processed at . The set of path choices available at node is defined to be -and the best possible path at is defined to be This path represents the highest ranked path possible for node , given the messages received from its peers. Fig. 5 presents the process that runs at each node . The notation and semantics are from [6] . If there is an unprocessed message from any , the guard receive from can be activated causing the message to be deleted from the incoming communication link and processed according to the program to the right of the arrow . We assume that this program is executed in one atomic step and that the communication channels are reliable and preserve message order. This protocol ensures that -always contains the most recently processed message from peer and that is always the highest ranked path that can adopt that is consistent with these paths.
The network state of the system is the collection of values -, and the state of all communication links. It should be clear that any network state implicitly defines the path assignment . A network state is stable if all communication links are empty. In Section V-E, it is shown that the path assignment associated with any stable state is always a stable path assignment, and thus a solution to the stable paths problem. Therefore, if the stable paths problem has no solution, then SPVP always diverges.
For example, consider BAD GADGET from Fig. 2(d) . Using SPVP, it is easy to construct a sequence of network states that are associated with the path assignments of Fig. 6 . In this figure, an underlined path indicates that it has changed from the previous path assignment. Notice that this sequence begins and ends with the same path assignment and so represents one round of an oscillation.
A stable paths problem is called safe if the protocol SPVP always converges. Note that SPP solvability does not imply safety. For example, NAUGHTY GADGET has a solution, but SPVP evaluation for this system can diverge. Whereas BAD GADGET is unable to converge, NAUGHTY GADGET can oscillate for an arbitrary amount of time before converging to a solution. In other words, NAUGHTY GADGET can produce both persistent and transient oscillations.
V. A SUFFICENT CONDITION FOR SPP SOLVABILITY, SAFETY, AND ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we analyze the stable paths problem. First, we show that determining if a solution exists is an NP-complete problem. We then define dispute wheels and show that the lack of dispute wheels is a sufficient condition which guarantees that a stable paths problem has a unique solution. With respect to the protocol SPVP, we show that this sufficient condition also implies safety and robustness.
A. Complexity of SPP Solvability
We now investigate the computational complexity of determining if a solution exists for an instance of the stable paths problem. For a review of complexity theory, see [5] .
Theorem V.1: The problem of determining whether an instance of the stable paths problem is solvable is NP-complete.
Proof: We begin by noting that this problem is in NP, since we only need to guess a path assignment and check that it is indeed stable. This can clearly be done in time polynomial in the size of the instance of SPP.
The rest of the proof relies on a reduction from 3-SAT, a well-known NP-complete problem. An instance of 3-SAT consists of a set of Boolean variables and a formula based on these variables and their negations where the formula has the form of a conjunction of terms each of which is a disjunction of three literals (a literal is either a variable or its negation ). The 3-SAT} problem asks if there exists a satisfying assignment for a given instance.
Suppose we are given an instance of 3-SAT with variables . We now construct an instance of the stable paths problem that is solvable if and only if has a satisfying assignment.
For each variable we use the structure of DISAGREE (Fig. 3 ) to construct a "variable assignment gadget" shown in Fig. 7(a) . The two distinct solutions of this gadget, depicted in Fig. 7(b) and (c), represent the assignment of to true and false, respectively.
Given an arbitrary clause of , the instance contains a node labeled . For each literal in , there is an edge from to the corresponding node of the variable assignment gadget for the variable of that literal. The node has only three permitted paths, each of length 2, corresponding to the variable assignment that makes the literals true. (Note that the ranking is not important.) See Fig. 8 This process continues until for some , either 1) or 2) and . In the first case, is clearly a stable path assignment. In the second case, we are stuck, and the procedure fails to find a solution.
If we perform this sequence of operations on GOOD GADGET [ Fig. 2(a) ], then it will arrive at the solution depicted in Fig. 2(b) . However, for both NAUGHTY GADGET and BAD GADGET, this procedure will get stuck attempting to construct (that is, is empty). This is because each node that has a direct path to , (nodes 1, 2, and 3), prefers a path that is not direct. We now show that getting stuck implies the existence of a circular set of conflicting rankings between nodes, which we call a dispute wheel.
Formally, a dispute wheel, , of size }, is a sequence of nodes , and sequences of nonempty paths and , such that for each we have (1) is a path from to , (2) , (3) , and (4) . (All subscripts are to be interpreted modulo .) See Fig. 9(a) for an illustration of a dispute wheel. Since permitted paths are simple, it follows that the size of any dispute wheel is at least 2.
Both NAUGHTY GADGET and BAD GADGET of Fig. 2 have the dispute wheel shown in Fig. 9(b) . In addition, NAUGHTY GADGET has the dispute wheel in Fig. 9(c) . It may be the case that nodes of appear multiple times in and multiple times in any of the paths of and . For example, consider the SPP shown in Fig. 9(d) . This system has the dispute wheel in Fig. 9 (e). Note that nodes 1, 2, and 3 must be duplicated in order to present this dispute wheel in an "untangled" form.
C. No Dispute Wheel Implies Solvability
If is a dispute wheel, the triple resulting from suppressing index is defined to be where and result from removing from and from and , where . A sub-wheel of is any dispute wheel obtained by a sequence of such operations. A minimal dispute wheel is one in which for each , either is not permitted at , or . Note that any dispute wheel of size 2 is minimal.
Lemma V.2: Every dispute wheel contains a minimal subwheel.
Proof: Suppose that dispute wheel is not minimal. Then for some in we have . Create a sub-wheel by suppressing index . Repeating this process must eventually arrive at a minimal sub-wheel.
Theorem V.3: Let be an instance of the stable paths problem. If has no dispute wheel, then is solvable.
Proof: Suppose that our heuristic procedure gets stuck at step . Let be any node in and let be a direct path. Note that there must be a path , permitted at and consistent with , which has higher rank than . Since is consistent with it has the form where is a path from to in is . and . Note that , and since is empty we can repeat this process with . If we continue in this manner it is clear that we will eventually form a dispute wheel. Note that BAD BACKUP is solvable and yet has a dispute wheel.
D. No Dispute Wheel Implies a Unique Solution
In general, an instance of the stable paths problem may have more than one solution. We show that in this case the problem has a dispute wheel.
Theorem V. 4 : If the stable paths problem has no dispute wheel, then it has a unique solution.
Proof: Suppose that has no dispute wheel, and has two distinct solutions, and . Let and be the trees, rooted at node 0, that are defined by the nonempty paths of and respectively. Let be the graph which is induced by the intersection of these two trees. Now let be the component of containing the origin. Thus every edge of entering is either in or . See Fig. 10 for an illustration. We now construct a dispute wheel. Note that implies that is nonempty, and that at least one of the trees has an edge entering . Without loss of generality, consider any in where is in , and is not. Note that must be in , otherwise it would have the empty path in , which it cannot prefer to the path . We may choose an edge , where and . On the other hand, has a path to the origin in . This path must be of the form where (i) and is the unique path in from to the origin, (ii) is a path from to in but entirely contained in the node set and (iii) has at least one edge (for otherwise one of would not be stable). We repeat this process at , except we now examine a path from to the origin in the tree . Continuing to alternate in this fashion, we must eventually repeat some node, which without loss of generality is .
To see that this is a dispute wheel, we need only show that for each Without loss of generality, assume that is in . If the inequality did not hold, then we would have which would mean that is not stable. Note that NAUGHTY GADGET has a unique solution and has a dispute wheel.
E. No Dispute Wheel Implies Safety
We now show that the protocol SPVP can never diverge for an instance of the stable paths problem that has no dispute wheel.
We Proof: By repeated application of Lemma V.5, we know that the state at time is consistent, and since the system has converged we know that all communication links are empty. By pipe-consistency, we know that if and are peers, then . Therefore, if is not a solution for , then there is some node that is not rib-consistent, which is a contradiction.
Suppose is a consistent state, is a fair activation sequence with respect to , and that . The set of converging nodes, , are those nodes such that for some time and for all , we have . The oscillating nodes, denoted , is the set of nodes in not in .
By the definition of , we can define a time such that for all and for all . If and is a peer of , then after time no new messages are placed into and so by the fairness of there is a time such that for all times all such messages from nodes in have been flushed from all communication links. In particular, for all and all -for all peers of . For , let be the fixed message infor all peers of and hence the message in for all . For every , define to be the set of paths that adopts infinitely often. For every define to be the singleton set . Let be the time after which each adopts only paths in . For a simple path and for any with , we denote by the subpath . Lemma V.7: For , suppose that . Then there is a time after which there is no path of the form in the network state. . By Lemma V.7, there is a time after which there is no path of the form in the network state. Therefore, cannot adopt this path infinitely often, which is a contradiction. A similar argument holds for the case where is a node in and . Theorem V.9: If has no dispute wheel, then is safe.
Proof: Suppose that diverges, . We show that contains a dispute wheel. Let , and be defined as above. Let be any time . Let be the subset of nodes such that there is a path where . That is, each in adopts a path that leads directly to a fixed node. By Lemma V.8, cannot be empty.
We now construct a dispute wheel. Let be a node in . Let be 's direct path to . It is easy to check that is unique, and that of all paths in the path is of lowest rank. Let be the adopted path of highest rank at . Lemma V.8 tells us that we can write this path as , where is a path from to of changing nodes, , and for some . We can now perform the same construction for . Repeating this process in the obvious way results in a dispute wheel.
F. No Dispute Wheel Implies Robustness
We model the failure of an arbitrary number of links as follows. Let be an instance of the stable paths problem where . Suppose . We define to be the stable paths problem obtained by 1) deleting the edges from the graph ; 2) removing all permitted paths that traverse an edge in ; and 3) amending the ranking functions accordingly. The problem is fragile if is solvable but there exists some such that is not solvable. The problem is robust if is safe and for each the problem is also safe. The system GOOD GADGET of Fig. 2(a) is robust, while BAD BACKUP of Fig. 4 is fragile.
Theorem V.10: Let be an instance of the stable paths problem. If has no dispute wheel, then is robust.
Proof: Suppose that has no dispute wheel. From Theorem V.9, we know that is safe. Suppose that . If is not safe, then by Theorem V.9 there must be a dispute wheel for . But any dispute wheel for is also a dispute wheel for , which is a contradiction. Hence, is robust.
VI. STABLE PATHS AND SHORTEST PATHS
Varadhan et al. [21] first observed that BGP policies could interact in a way that results in protocol divergence. Their examples always include autonomous systems that choose longer paths (in terms of "hop count") over shorter ones. They stated "We believe that only shortest path route selection is provably safe." The results of the previous sections will be used to explore this statement. We interpret it to mean that any class of policies not based on shortest path route selection will not be provably safe. Notice that implicitly, the conjecture is suggesting that systems whose policies are based on shortest path route selection will, in fact, be safe.
We begin by formalizing a fairly liberal notion of "shortest path route selection" that seems appropriate for a protocol such as BGP. We then show that any instance of the stable paths problem that is consistent with shortest path route selection will indeed be safe. However, we show BGP-like systems can actually violate distance metrics and remain still safe.
As is standard for undirected graphs, we work with an associated digraph, where each undirected edge is replaced by two arcs, and . We are also given costs and associated with traversing the edge in the two directions. Thus induces a cost function on any directed path in the resulting digraph:
. The cost function is positive if for each arc . There are several possible ways to formalize the notion of shortest path route selection for a cost function . Since a node is not required to treat all possible paths to the origin as permitted paths, we cannot insist that take the shortest path. However, it seems reasonable to insist that if has a choice between two permitted paths and these paths have different costs, then cannot prefer the higher cost path over the lower cost path. Formally, we say that an instance of the stable paths problem, , is consistent with the cost function if for each and , (1) if , then , and (2) if , then . If a cost function has negative directed cycles, then can be consistent with and yet not be safe. For example, consider the costs attached to the edges of NAUGHTY GADGET in Fig. 11 , where the cost of traversing an edge is the same in each direction. NAUGHTY GADGET is consistent with this cost function, but it is not safe. Note that this graph contains a cycle of cost 16. Also, notice that any will be consistent with the cost function that has cost 0 for every arc and so, in particular, NAUGHTY GADGET will be consistent with such a cost function. Thus, we restrict ourselves to SPVP specifications consistent with cost functions that do not realize any directed cycles of cost at most 0.
Define a cost function to be coherent if it does not result in any nonpositive directed cycles. Note that any positive cost function is coherent. Theorem VI.1: If is consistent with a coherent cost function, then has no dispute wheel.
Proof: Suppose that is a coherent cost function, is consistent with , and contains a dispute wheel of size . For any , we have , and so . Summing these inequalities, we obtain After cancellation, this implies . Thus the rim of the dispute wheel is a cycle of cost at most zero, which is a contradiction.
From Theorem V.9, we can conclude that any consistent with a positive cost function is safe. In particular, routing policies based on hop count (even with AS padding) are always safe. In addition, it can be shown that if all paths are permitted, then this results in a shortest path routing tree.
Note that the system INCOHERENT of Fig. 12 has no dispute wheel, and hence is safe, yet it is not consistent with any coherent cost function. To see this, suppose that we are given arc costs and . The cost for any other arc is arbitrary. Suppose INCOHERENT is consistent with these costs, then the fact that node prefers path (1 2 3 0) over path (1 0) means that . Also, the fact that node 4 prefers path (4 3 1 0) over path (4 3 0) means that . Adding these inequalities together, we obtain . By cancellation, we arrive at , so there is a nonpositive cycle (1 2 3 1) . That is, INCOHERENT is not consistent with any coherent cost function.
In summary, the class of stable path problems having no dispute wheels is provably safe, yet it is strictly larger than those based on shortest paths.
VII. DISCUSSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
Is it possible to guarantee that BGP will not diverge? Broadly speaking, there are three complementary approaches to addressing this problem: 1) operational guidelines; 2) static analysis of routing policies; and 3) dynamic detection. We briefly discuss each of these techniques.
A set of operational guidelines is a collection of rules that should be followed by every autonomous system. One use of the framework presented in this paper is to prove that a given collection of rules will indeed guarantee safe BGP policies. For example, using the results of Section VI, it is easy to see that any set of BGP policies that can be implemented using route filtering alone will be safe. This includes standard policies that determine which routes should be imported from and exported to customers, peers, and upstream providers [15] . A more elaborate set of guidelines, together with correctness proofs, can be found in [4] . One difficulty with this approach is that many Internet service providers (ISPs) are in fact composed of multiple autonomous systems. Restrictions that make economic sense when we think of autonomous systems as independent ISPs may no longer hold when they are all owned by the same company. The member autonomous systems of BGP confederations [20] can be considered as a special case of this kind of multi-AS service provider.
A solution based on static analysis would rely on programs to analyze routing policies to verify that they did not contain policy conflicts that could lead to protocol divergence. This is essentially the approach advocated in Govindan et al. [9] . However, there are two practical challenges facing this approach. First, autonomous systems currently do not widely share their routing policies, or only publish incomplete specifications. Second, even if there were complete knowledge of routing policies, Griffin and Wilfong [11] have shown that checking for various global convergence conditions is either NP-complete or NP-hard. Therefore, a static approach would most likely require the development of new heuristic algorithms for detecting this class of policy conflict.
A dynamic solution to the BGP divergence problem would be some mechanism to suppress or completely prevent at "run time" those BGP oscillations that arise from policy conflicts. Using route flap dampening [22] as a dynamic mechanism to address this problem has two distinct drawbacks. First, route flap dampening cannot eliminate BGP protocol oscillations; it will only make these oscillations run in "slow motion." Second, route flap dampening events do not provide network administrators with enough information to identify the source of the route flapping. In other words, route flapping caused by policy conflicts will look the same as route flapping caused by unstable routers or defective network interfaces. So it seems that any dynamic solution would require an extension to the BGP protocol to carry additional information that would allow policy disputes to be detected and identified at run time.
Such an extension is presented in [12] . This is done by adding a dynamically computed attribute to SPVP called the path history. Protocol oscillations caused by policy conflicts produce paths whose histories contain cycles. These cycles correspond to dispute wheels, and identify the policy conflicts and the nodes systems involved. This protocol can be further extended to automatically suppress those paths whose histories contain cycles. This guarantees that the resulting protocol can never diverge.
There are several open problems that need to be addressed. The computational complexity of deciding safety or robustness for an SPP specification remains open. Our treatment has ignored the complexities of interior BGP (IBGP), such as route reflectors and confederations. We have also ignored address aggregation. These issues need to be addressed in a more complete model of BGP.
In this paper, we have studied the stable paths as a computational problem. However, the stable paths problem could be studied in the context of a multiperson repeated game where each node corresponds to a player and each subgame requires every node to choose a path from the set of permitted paths at . We do not define this game in its most formal terms (see [3] for an introduction to game theory), but rather give a slight simplification of the strategy sets for the players. A pure strategy for node is a function where , then we must have . The interpretation is that if at time , each node has chosen the path , then determines the path which node will adopt at time . A play of the game corresponds to each node fixing some pure strategy and then playing each subgame (we may assume that each path stores the empty path at time 0) and updating the paths stored at each node accordingly. The payoff for node after game is simply the rank of the path it stores at that time. A (pure) Nash equilibrium for the game corresponds to a play of the game where for some , we have that for each node and . We note that a mixed strategy for a player corresponds to some collection of pure strategies for that player and an assignment such that ; thus the player will use the strategy with probability . Finally, we remark that BGP defines a unique pure strategy for each player which it must then use always. Namely, a node must always choose its best path amongst those available. Thus a player's strategy is time independent, and so it can only alter its strategy (and hence any equilibrium adopted) by changing the ranking of its paths.
